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The Entrapment Defense and the
Procedural Issues: Burden of
Proof, Questions of Law and
Fact, Inconsistent Defenses
By Paul Marcus·
Dean Marcus has produced an extremely thorough article on the
intriguing and complex defense of entrapment. After analyzing the
subjective and objective approaches to the defense, the author turns
to the infrequently addressed question of evidence on predisposition. Included here are the recent ABSCAM cases.
Finally, the author explores the vagaries of inconsistent defenses
and, on the whole , provides academics and practitioners with a
refreshing and useful guide to some of the most important questions
involving entrapment.

For most of this century an intense debate has raged invol ving practicing lawyers, judges, and law professors concerning
the defense of entrapment. I Little question has been raised as to
whether we should recognize an entrapment defense. 2 The controversy has , instead, focused chiefly on two questions. The
first issue is the reason for having an entrapment defense. A
majority of Supreme Court judges3 have taken the view that the
reason for having an entrapment defense is that the legislature
could never have intended to allow convictions for crimes
where the accused was pressured by the government into committing the crime. The classic, and concise, statement in support of this point of view was expressed by Chief Justice Warren in Sherman v. United States: "Congress could not have

* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona.
1 For two different views of the debate, see Park, "The Entrapment Controversy," 60 Minn. L. Rev. 163 (1976); Groot, "The Serpent Beguiled Me and I
(Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime and the Entrapment Defense," 1973 U.
Ill. L.F. 254.

2 The defense was "firmly recognized" in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(l932), and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).

3

The view was first put forth by Chief Justice Hughes in Sorrells. 287 U.S. at 448.
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intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations."4
The contrary view was, perhaps, best stated by Justice
Frankfurter who viewed the purpose for the entrapment defense
as deterring improper police conduct. As he wrote in the Sherman case:
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his
conduct falls outside the proscription of the statute , but because , even if
his guilt be admitted , the methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced. * * * Insofar
as they are used as instrumentalities in the administration of criminal
justice , the federal courts have an obligation to set their face against
enforcement of the law by lawless means or means that violate rationally
vindicated standards of justice, and to refuse to sustain such methods by
effectuating them. They do this in the exercise of a recognized jurisdiction to formulate and apply' 'proper standards for the enforcement of the
federal criminal law in the federal courts, " an obligation that goes
beyond the conviction of the particular defendant before the court.
Public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of justice ,
upon which ultimately depends the rule of law , is the transcending value
at stake . 5

356 U.S. at 372. He explained :
The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension
of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of
crime . Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in
the arsenal of the police officer. However, " A different question is presented
when the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and they
implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged
offense and induce a commission in order that they may prosecute ." Then stealth
and strategy become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession.

4

Id.

356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He , too, explained further:
It is surely sheer fiction to suggest that a conviction cannot be had when a
defendant has been entrapped by government officers or informers because
" Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be e·nforced by
tempting innocent persons into violations. " In those cases raising claims of
entrapment, the only legislative intention that can with any show of reason be
extracted from the statute is the intention to make criminal precisely the conduct
in which the defendant has engaged. That conduct excludes all the elements
nece ssary to constitute criminality. Without compulsion and " knowingly ,"
where that is requisite, the defendant has violated the statutory command. Ifhe is
to be relieved from the usual punitive consequences, it is on no account because
he is innocent of the offense described. In these circumstances, conduct is not
less criminal because the result of temptation, whether the tempter is a private
person or a government agent or informer.
ld . at 379-380.
5
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The second issue is a corollary of the first. Depending on
which rationale one accepts for the defense, the test utilized
follows inexorably. Thus, for those judges who follow the majority view, looking to the conduct of the suspect, a "subjective" test has been generally used in which the predisposition of
the defendant is of principal concern.
[We] recognize "that the fact that officers or employees of the government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the
offense does not defeat the prosecution." Nor will the mere fact of
deceit defeat a prosecution, for there are circumstances when the use of
deceit is the only practicable law enforcement technique available. It is
only when the Government's deception actually implants the criminal
design in the mind of the defendant that the defense of entrapment
comes into play. 6

For those who follow the position put forth by Justice
Frankfurter, an "objective" test has been used, looking to the
conduct of the police as opposed to that of the suspect.
The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct
itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls
below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use
of governmental power. For answer it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the
.. intention" to commit the crime originated with the defendant or government officers, or if the criminal conduct was the product of "the
creative activity" of law-enforcement officials. Yet in the present case
the Court repeats and purports to apply these unrevealing tests. Of
course in every case of this kind the intention that the particular crime be
committed originates with the police, and without their inducement the
crime would not have occurred. But it is perfectly clear [as] where the
police [simply furnish] the opportunity for the commission of the crime,
that this is not enough to enable the defendant to escape conviction. 7

The debate over these two points continues. 8 Some states
that have traditionally followed the Supreme Court's role in the
criminal procedure area have rejected the subjective view and
instead look to the objective test. 9 Other states have flirted with
one or the other ultimately adopting a combination of the two. 10
6

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-436 (1973).

7

Shennan v. United States, 356 U.S. at 382.

8

See generally, Park, note I supra.

9

See, e.g., California v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1979).

10

E.g., New Jersey v. Rockholt, 476 A.2d 1236 (N.J. 1984).

199

CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN

Some of the most important issues concerning the entrapment
defense have little to do with this debate, however. Many of the
practice-oriented questions involving entrapment deal with the
procedures utilized at trial. Surprisingly, relatively little has
been written concerning this and the debate over these various
questions has been mild in comparison. I I
For a lawyer who wishes to analyze the entrapment defense
and determine its applicability in a criminal prosecution, however, the procedural issues can be paramount. In particular,
issues surrounding the burden of proof, questions of law and
fact, and the so-called inconsistent defense doctrine can often
be determinative of the ultimate question. In this article these
three areas will be analyzed, reviewing their status under both
the majority-subjective defense and the minority-objective defense.
The Burden of Proof

Many courts take very different views as to the purposes of
the defense of entrapment and the way in which evidence shall
be presented in connection with this defense. These different
views are reflected quite clearly with respect to the burden of
proof as to entrapment. Courts that follow the "subjective"
approach to entrapment differ considerably from those that
adhere to the "objective" approach. Moreover, even courts
that follow the same substantive test for entrapment may differ
when it comes to formulating the standards of proof and the
manner in which proof shall be offered as to this defense.
The Subjective Approach

While the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to discuss the
precise burden of proof issue , in the majority of jurisdictions the
matter has been resolved by reliance on a famous opinion by
Judge Learned Hand. In United States v. Sherman,1 2 the court
discussed the burden of proof issue as involving two questions
of "fact." The first of these is, Did the agent induce the accused to commit the offense charged in the indictment? The
second is, If so, was the accused ready and willing without
II

But see Groot, note I supra.

12

200 F.2d 800, 882 (2d Cir. 1952).
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persuasion and was he awaiting any propitious opportunity to
commit the offense? The first element is generally referred to
as the inducement factor, the second as the accused's predisposition. Under the Hand formulation, the burden of proving
the first element generally is on the defendant. The government
shoulders the burden of proving predisposition.
The Hand approach has been recognized as the classic formulation and has been relied on in numerous cases. The Second
Circuit in United States v. Braver 13 pointed out that the courts
had "bifurcated the defense of entrapment into two elements,
inducement and propensity. "14 As to the former, the defendant
had the burden; as to the latter, the burden was on the government. The court went on to "recognize that this analysis of the
entrapment defense is based upon Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United Sta te s v. Sherman."
In some ways, the standard formulated by Judge Hand, and
readily accepted throughout the country, created more problems than it resolved. Several matters in particular are of importance in determining the nature of the defendant's burden in a
showing of entrapment. The first relates to the concept of "inducement" in the Hand formulation. The Second Circuit had
initially defined it very broadly so as to include "soliciting,
proposing, initiating, broaching, or suggesting." 16 As pointed
out by Judge Friendly, however, this definition of inducement
"goes simply to the government's initiation of the crime and not
to the degree of pressure exerted. "17 Hence, under the original
Hand formulation, the defense could be raised simply with a
showing of any government solicitation or initiation. Many
courts rebelled against such a broad view either by narrowing
the definition of "inducement" or by placing a burden on the
defendant with respect to a showing of lack of predisposition.
As indicated above, a literal definition of Judge Hand's
formulation would include almost all government contacts that
(5

13

450 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1971).

14/d. at 801; see also United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 1491, 1499 (lith Cir.

1985).
I S 200 F.2d 800 n.5; see generally United States v. Stanley, 765 F.2d 1224,
1234-1235 (lith Cir. 1985).

16

In Sherman, 200 F.2d at 883.

17

United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1966).
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tended to initiate criminal activity. Many courts today, however, take a narrower view and require a much greater showing
by the defendant. The experience in the Ninth Circuit is both
illuminating and somewhat surprising.
In Notaro v. United States, 18 the court dealt with the question of burden of proof in the area of entrapment. In its conclusion, the court very broadly noted that "if the defense of entrapment is claimed, a showing, however presented, that the
commission of the offense was attended by the intervention of a
government agent is sufficient." 19 The Ninth Circuit (by the
same judge who had written the Notaro opinion) suggested in
another case that such language should not be literally applied;
otherwise the entrapment issue would arise in all cases in which
government agents even attempted to make a contact for the
purchase of narcotics. It is not enough, the court stated in
United States v. Christopher, "that the government furnished
the opportunity for the commission of a crime ... (there must
still be] some evidence of inducement or persuasion by the
government. "20 What that persuasion would be, however, has
not been defined by the courts, though most are reluctant to
allow the defense to be raised simply on the basis of proof of
some government contact. 21
For those courts that have attempted to require more of the
defendant than simply a showing of inducement, the approach
has taken two forms. Some courts have adopted a so-called

18

363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966).

191d. at 174 n.6.

488 F .2d 849, 850-851 (9th Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Andrews, 765
F.2d 1491, 1499 (l1th Cir. 1985).
20

21

See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 165-169 (5th Cir. 1969), cut.

denied, 396 U.S. 960; see also United States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d 1069,1071 (4th Cir.
1970), cerl. denied, 402 U.S. 950: .. solicitation by itself is not the kind of conduct that

would persuade an otherwise innocent person to commit a crime." This view is
expressed in many of the modem jury instructions. Typical of this approach is that
found in the District of Columbia Bar Association's, Criminal Jury Instructions No.
5.03 (3d ed. 1978), which contains a narrow definition of the term inducement:
Inducement by law enforcement officials may take many forms including persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises
of reward or pleas based on need, sympathy or friendship. A solicitation, request
or approach by law enforcement officials to engage in criminal activity, standing
alone, is not an inducement.
See discussion in United States V. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 911-914 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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unitary standard. See, for instance, Kadis v. United States. 22
The court there centered its attention on both a showing of
inducement and proof of non-predisposition.
If the defendant shows , through government witnesses or otherwise ,
some indication that a government agent corrupted him, the burden of
disproving entrapment will be on the government; but such a showing is
not made simply by evidence of a solicitation. There must be some
evidence tending to show unreadiness. 23

The other approach, most prominently put forth by the
Second Circuit, requires a "more cumbersome procedural
mechanism. "24 Under this rule, if the defendant offers some
evidence of government initiation of the criminal activity, the
prosecution then must demonstrate defendant's predisposition.
At that point, however, if the prosecution satisfies the burden,
the defendant must then come forward and demonstrate evidence of lack of predisposition. Unless such evidence of lack of
predisposition is demonstrated , the defendant is not entitled to
an instruction on entrapment even though the defendant previously showed some government initiation. 25
Both approaches create rather obvious difficulties. The procedures in both cases tend to be awkward, at best. Moreover,
they both tend to defeat the essential point of the Hand formulation, that the defendant should have no burden with respect to
the nature of the government contact, but that the government
should have to prove that "the accused [was] ready and willing
22

373 F.2d 370, 374 (1st CiT. 1967).

23 See also United States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1079 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950.
24 As stated by Judge McGowan in United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903,914,
(D.C . Cir. 1978). The Burkley opinion is a thoughtful analysis of the procedural
problems connected with the entrapment defense.

2S In the Riley case , 363 F.2d 955,958 (2d Cir. 1966), Judge Friendly discussed the
principle:
[E]ven when inducement has been shown, submission to the jury is not required if
uncontradicted proof has established that the accused was " ready and willing
without persuasion" and to have been " awaiting any propitious opportunity to
commit the offense ." In such cases there is no real issue for the jury even though
in strict theory it might create one by speCUlating that the agents had found the
defendant less willing than they said. On the other hand, the production of any
evidence negating propensity, whether in cross-examination or otherwise require s submission to the jury, however unreasonable the judge would consider a
verdict in favor of the defendant to be.
ld. at 959.
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without persuasion ... to commit the offense. " In addition,
there is a real question of how a defendant would go about to
prove the negative, that he was not predisposed. As a consequence, most courts have rejected this unitary standard
(whether in a single procedure or in two procedures) and have
avoided the problem by requiring the defendant to make a
showing as to inducement that involves more than "mere solicitation," but that ultimately places the burden of predisposition
on the government.
A few courts require very little in the way of a burden on the
defendant with regard to evidence of entrapment. In these
courts, the burden is more correctly defined as one of production of evidence rather than of persuasion. That is, these courts
require the defendant only to offer evidence of governmental
inducement. At that point, the burden shifts to the government
to prove predisposition. 26
For those courts that require more than a production of
evidence, there is a host of possible approaches. Some courts
speak in terms of ,. any foundation in the evidence" to demonstrate inducement. 27 Others talk of evidence that amounts to
"more than a scintilla. "28 Still others refer to the requirement
that the defendant must put the inducement question . 'in issue. "29 The majority of state and federal courts to consider the
issue have, however, selected one ofthree approaches concerning the defense burden. The most limited burden is requiring the
26 See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Jones , 416 A.2d 676, 679 (R.I. 1980); Washington v.
Ziegler, 575 P.2d 723, 724·725 (Wash. 1978); United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083,
1086-1087 (3d eir. 1975).
27

United States v. Timberlake, 559 F.2d 1375, 1379 (5th eir. 1977).

28

United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th eir. 1979).

29 United States v. Woosley, 761 F.2d 445, 448 (8th eir. 1985); but see United
States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1080 (5th eir. 1985):
We believe that our previous references to "any evidence" and "more than a
scintilla" both point in the same direction-that evidence from which a reasonable juror could derive a reasonable doubt as to the origin of criminal intent and,
thus entrapment. Entrapment is not raised by special plea but, rather, by identification or production of evidence. Thus, for the defendant to obtain an entrapment instruction based on the evidence at trial, the evidence ought, at the least,
provide a basis for a reasonable doubt on whether criminal intent originated with
the government. This follows because, ifthe evidence of entrapment is sufficient
to submit the issue to the jury the district court must instruct the jury to acquit
unless the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
predisposed-that the criminal intent originated with the defendant.
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defendant to offer "some evidence of government conduct that
would create a risk of causing an otherwise unpredisposed
person to commit the crime charged. "30 The second and higher
standard was recently discussed by the Florida Supreme Court
in the case of Florida v. Wheeler. 31 "The defendant has the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of entrapment.
The trial court determines the legal sufficiency of the evidence
of entrapment. If the defendant has not made a prima facie case,
the defense of entrapment does not go to the jury. ' '32
Probably the leading standard used is the usual civil evidentiary rule, preponderance of the evidence. This is the principle
put forth by both the drafters of the Model Penal Code 33 and the
original proposed revised Federal Criminal Code. 3 4 In short, the
great likelihood is that in a situation where the usual subjective
approach to entrapment is raised, the burden on the defendant
will be to show by a fair preponderance of the evidence the
issue of entrapment. 3 S
30 United State s v. Burkley, 591 F.2d at 914; see also United States v. Andrews,
765 F.2d 1491, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985).
31

468 So. 2d 978 (Aa. 1985).

Jl Jd. at 981. The court went on to explain that once the jury is instructed on the
ultimate issue of entrapment- if the defendant has made the prima facie case-the
jury should not receive any additional information respecting this prima facie case
burden .

If, howe ver, a prima facie case is made, the issue of entrapment is submitted to
the jury with appropriate instruction . . . but the jury is not instructed on the
defendant's initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. The burden lies with
the State to disprove entrapment, which is usually done by proving the predisposition of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jd. ; see also United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 856 (5th Cir. 1985).
J] Model Penal Code § 2.13(2) places the burden on the defendant to prove" by a
preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment ...
One should be wary of placing too much emphasis on both the Model Penal Code and
the proposed Federal Criminal Code, however, as each involves the objective test,
not the majority subjective test. See generally Park, "The Entrapment Controversy " 60 Minn. L. Rev. 163,263-266 (1976). For an example of a state statute that
uses both the subjective standard and the preponderance principle, see Del. Code
Ann . tit. 11, § 432, 304 (1979).

J 4 Brown Commission Report § 702(1), dealing with the proposed code , indicates
that entrapment is an affirmative defense. An earlier section of the proposal notes
that affirmative defenses place the burden on the defendant "of persuasion by a
preponderance of the evidence ." National Commission on Reform, Federal Criminal
Laws 314-317 (1970) (I working papers).

J5 See, e.g. , New York v. Ventura, 487 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1985); Minnesota v.
Holbrook, 230 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. 1975); United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799,802
(2d CiT. 1971).
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The final point to be raised in connection with these standards is whether they are different from each other in substance. As indicated previously, the question that actually arises
in most cases under the majority-subjective analysis is whether
predisposition can be shown. That is, in the vast majority of
cases raising the entrapment question, inducement is clear with
relatively little doubt. As pointed out by the Fifth Circuit,
"there is little indication, however, that these semantic discrepancies [some evidence, evidence in the record, etc.] have
realistically produced disparate results." 36
For the last decade a constitutional issue has been raised
with some regularity by defense counsel in the entrapment area,
though with a singular lack of success. The argument traces a
line of U.S. Supreme Court cases which discusses the burden of
proof in criminal cases. Defense lawyers have argued that all
burdens with respect to the entrapment defense should be on
the government, beyond a reasonable doubt. The earliest Supreme Court case cited dealing with the broad issue of the
government burden is In re Winship. There, the Court explained
that each element of each offense must, under the constitution,
be proved by the government and not the defendant. ,. [T]he
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. "37
36 United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 1301, 1303 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980). It is worth noting
that the analysis given above applies only in the usual subjective test jurisdictions.
For a discussion ofthe objective test jurisdictions , see text accompanying notes 52-61
infra. A few states have unusual rules that do not fit in either category. See, for
instance, New Jersey v. Rockholt, 476 A.2d 1236 (N.J. 1984), where the court
interpreted the recent codification of the entrapment rules as combining both the
objective and the subjective tests. Hence, in New Jersey at this time , "the defendant
must prove by preponderance of the evidence , that the police conduct constituted
entrapment by both objective and subjective standards." /d. at 1241.
37

397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Court explained further:

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has [a] vital role in our
criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution
has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that
he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would
be stigmatized by the conviction ....
Moreover, use ofthe reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is
critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.
Id. at 363, 364.
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Perhaps the "high-water mark" with respect to the principle
is the well-known case of MuLLaney v. Wilbur. 38 There, the
defendant was charged with murder but evidence was offered to
indicate voluntary manslaughter based on the proposition that
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Maine
required that the government prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the intentional killing but that the defendant was required to prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Because
the factor of heat of passion was actually an element of the
crime (voluntary manslaughter was defined as a killing done in
the heat of passion), the Court concluded that the state had
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof, as to this element, to
the defendant. Under Winship, according to the majority, the
result was impermissible because "the Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of the heat of passion .... "39
The Court was never again to go as far as it did in Mullaney
v. Wilbur , a case that, admittedly, involved an unusual fact
pattern where an apparent "defense" was actually an element
of the crime. For instance, in Patterson v. New York,40 state law
required that the defendant in a prosecution for second-degree
murder prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she
acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance in
order to reduce the crime to manslaughter. The Court in Patterson distinguished the Mullaney holding, finding that the factor at
issue in New York was not an element of the offense as it had
been in Maine. 41
In a number of recent entrapment cases, defense counsel
has relied on this line of constitutional determination by the
Court, arguing that a showing of inducement and predisposition
went to the heart of the case against the defendant. Thus the
burden, under the due process clause, should be on the government to prove "non-entrapment." These contentions have
been systematically rejected. The court in United States v.
38

421 U.S. 684 (1975).

39

[d. at 704.

40

432 U.S. 197 (1977).

41

[d. at 214-216.

207

CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN

Braver 42 noted that the defense of entrapment simply "does not
negate any of the essential elements of the crime. "43 That is,
under the traditional views of the entrapment defense, the defense is allowed as a matter of policy either because of legislative intent44 or because certain inducement activities on the part
of the government are inherently unacceptable. 4 5 In neither
situation, however, does the entrapment claim go to disproving
any of the essential elements of the crime. 46 As stated by one
recent New York court:
Nor contrary to defendant's contention, is there any constitutional
infirmity in imposing the burden of proving entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence upon the defendant as an affirmative defense.
Establishment of an entrapment defense does not negate the commission
of the crime charged or the existence of any element thereof. Rather this
affirmative defense' 'is designed to prevent punishment for an offense
which" is the product of the creative activity of [the state's] own
officials "by focusing on the inducing conduct of the police and the
defendant's predisposition. "47

While there may be some confusion as to the defense burden
under the subjective test, as indicated above, there is no confusion at all as to the government's burden. In both the federal
courts 48 and the state courts,4'J if the defendant satisfies the first
42

450 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1971).

43

[d. at 803.

44 See, e .g., Chief Justice Hughes' view in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 448 (1932).

45 The leading statement of this position is probably Justice Frankfurter' s in the
Sherman case, 356 U.S. at 380. See also Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457.
46 Indeed, in some jurisdictions the defendant wiJI have to admit the commission
of the offense in order to raise the entrapment defense. See tex.t accompanying note
168 infra .

47 New York v. Millard, 456 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203-204 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). See
also Washington v. Ziegler, 575 P.2d 723, 725 (Wash. 1978), where the court-after
affirming the propriety of placing the burden of proof as to an affirmative defense on
the defendant-also noted that Mullaney only dealt with the situation in which the
court was "to place the burden of persuasion on the defendant and negate facts which
the State is required by statute to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. "
48 See, e.g., United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903. 915 (D.C. CiT. 1978); United
States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 856 (5th Cif. 1985); United State s v. Hill, 62 F.2d
1301, 1304 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Humphrey, 670 F.2d 153, 155-156 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied. 456 U.S. 1010.

49 See, e .g., Watkins v. Georgia, 318 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 1985); Maine v. Jones, 388
A.2d 69, 71 (Me. 1978); Florida v. Wheeler, 468 So. 2d 979, 981 (Fla. 1985).
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prong of the Hand test, "the burden then shifts to the prosecution to prove the defendant's predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. At that stage, the focus shifts to a subjective inquiry
about the particular defendant's state of mind. "50
As stated by the court in Simmons v. Maryland,51 "the burden as to the second question-was the defendant's criminal
conduct due to his own readiness and not to the persuasion of
the police, that is, did he have a predisposition to commit the
offense-is on the State. This must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt."
The Objective Approach

In a minority of jurisdictions, the "objective" approach to
entrapment is followed, as espoused by both the Model Penal
Code 52 and the proposed revised Federal Criminal Code of the
initial Brown Commission. 53 Since the objective approach focuses not on the defendant's attitude or state of mind but rather
on the government's conduct, there is, at least ideally, no issue
regarding the defendant's predisposition. Thus, under both the
Model Penal Code and the proposed Federal Criminal Code,
entrapment is viewed as an "affirmative defense," which must
be shown by the defendant. In the comments to both these
proposed codes, the rationale given for placing the burden on
the defendant is that this defense does not deal with defeating an
element of the crime but instead is founded on public policy. As
noted by the minority in the Sorrells case, the entrapment
defense is based on "public policy which protects the purity of
government and its processes. "54 Those courts that have
adopted the objective approach have done so either because of
specific statutory enactments or because of judicial decisions. A
brief look at these two aspects of the approach is worthwhile.
One of the leading state cases dealing with the statutory
adoption of the objective standard is North Dakota v. Pfister. 55
50

United States v. Kelly , 748 F.2d 691, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

51

259 A.2d 814, 820 (Md. 1969).

52

Model Penal Code § 2.13(2).

53

Brown Commission Report §§ 702(1), 103.

S4

287 U.S. at 455.

55

264 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1978).
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The North Dakota Supreme Court there analyzed the North
Dakota statute which is identical to thtf language of the original
proposed Federal Criminal Code. The court noted that the final
report of the Commission on the Federal Code asserted that the
entrapment defense "is treated primarily as a curb upon improper law enforcement techniques, to which the predisposition
of the particular defendant is irrelevant. "56 As a consequence ,
the court found that the burden should be placed on the defendant, and the North Dakota legislature expressly did so by
stating that it was "an affirmative defense that the defendant
was entrapped into committing the offense. "57 The court also
pointed to the legislature's determination that "an affirmative
defense must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of
evidence. "58
The case of Michigan v. D'Angelo 59 is an excellent treatment of the adoption of the objective standard by judicial determination rather than statutory enactment. There, the court
looked to the rationale for the various entrapment standards and
determined that the objective standard was the better approach.
As a consequence, it held that the defendant should have the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she
was entrapped. The court stated that this was appropriate because' 'the defense of entrapment is not interjected to establish
the absence of an essential element of the crime but to present
facts collateral or incidental to the criminal act which justify
acquittal on the ground of an overriding public policy to deter
instigation of crime by enforcement officers in order to get a
conviction. "60 Once again, in response to the popular argument
that burdening the defendant with proving the defense of entrapment raises constitutional questions, the court simply de-

56/d. at 697.

57Id. at 699; see also N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-11.
58 N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-01-03. For a similar commentary on an entrapment
statute, see Hawaii v. Anderson, 572 P.2d 159 (Hawaii 1977). There are a number of
statutes dealing with the objective standard and requiring the defendant to shoulder
the burden by preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-209
(1947); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 702-237 (1976); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-11 (1985); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 313.
59

257 N.W.2d 655 (Mich. 1977).

60

[d. at 661.
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cided that the issue did not involve elements of the offense and
hence the due process clause was satisfied. 61
Questions of Law and Fact

The burden of proof problem, as discussed previously, becomes particularly acute when it focuses on the individual(s)
who must be satisfied by the offer of proof. In the entrapment
area, courts often loosely talk about entrapment existing as a
matter of law or a matter of fact. Indeed, some courts have even
suggested that entrapment as a matter of law can be disposed of
not by the court, but by the trier of fact, the jury. Generally,
however, questions of law and fact in the entrapment area
typically are resolved by looking to whether the jurisdiction
employs the subjective test or the objective test. The major
exception to this principle falls in those cases that would normally have the matter resolved by the jury, but the court concludes that entrapment has been shown so clearly that it can be
determined as a matter of law.
The Subjective Test

The subjective test as enunciated by the Supreme Court has
always been assumed, by the Court, to be typically resolved by
having entrapment viewed as a question of fact to be considered
by the jury. 62 The reason for this jury determination typically 63
is that " the issue of whether a defendant has been entrapped is
for the jury as part of its function of determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused. "64 Although the burden can constitutionally be placed on the defendant-because the factors involved in entrapment do not affect the elements of the offense
itselpS-the guilt or innocence consideration is foremost in the
61 1d. at 662. See also Pfister, 264 N.W.2d at 694; Anderson, 572 P.2d at 159.
62 The cases, of course, are: Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932);
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973).
63 Though the matter is not always for the jury, as in the Sherman case itself
where the Court concluded that the issue should be decided as a matter of law. 356
U.S. at 377.

64 1d.
65 The constitutional question typically involves analysis of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur and New York v. Patterson. concerning shifting the
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subjective test jurisdiction. "The fundamental rationale of the
entrapment defense, as established by the Supreme Court, is
that a defendant charged with a criminal offense is not guilty if
the criminal intent was implanted in him by the government. ' '66
This rationale is followed in most states that follow the
subjective approach; they generally submit the entrapment
issue to the juryY The federal cases, of course, consistently
follow the Supreme Court's view in concluding that "the question of entrapment goes to his guilt or innocence of the offense
charged and is to be resolved by the jury. "68
An unusual procedure with respect to questions of law and
fact in the entrapment area was developed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Minnesota v. GrilUe. 69 The court analyzed the
law of entrapment and concluded that it would retain the majority-subjective approach.
In the majority view , the inquiry on entrapment is concerned primarily
with the element of defendant's predisposition: whether it was his own
original intent to commit the crime charged. The defense must show that
the actions of the police went further than those necessary to produce
evidence of the defendant's criminality. 70
burden of proof as to proof of the elements of the offense. See text accompanying
notes 37-47 supra.
66

United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 , 208 (5th Cir. 1984).

67 See, e.g., Illinois v. Johnson , 462 N.E.2d 948 (Ill. 1984); Oregon v. McBride,
589 P.2d 1164 (Or. 1979), rev'd on other grounds , 599 P.2d 449 ; Hefner v. Oklahoma,
542 P.2d 527 (Okla. 1975); Ohio v. Hsie, 303 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio 1973); Arizona v.
Boccelli, 467 P.2d 740 (Ariz. 1970).

68 Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1%9); see also United States
v. Lentz, 624 F.2d 1280, 1286 (5th Cir. 1980) ("it is well settled that the question of
entrapment, if fairly raised, is one for the jury. "); United States v. Mayo , 705 F.2d
62, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1983) ("jury determinations of this issue are favored"); See
generally United States v. Rogers, 639 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).

69

230 N.W.2d 445 (Minn. 1975).

70

Jd. at 452. The court went on to explain why it was retaining the subjective test.

[W)e decline to adopt the [objective] approach suggested by defendant. To
determine entrapment we must distinguish between the " trap for the unwary
innocent and trap for the unwary criminal." If the latter is the target, there is no
entrapment. Where, as here, we have situations involving drug pushers, the
practicalities and realities are such that convictions would be almost nonexistent
if the "objective" theory of entrapment were adopted. If the evidence adduced by
the prosecution is accepted, then it becomes clear that the defendant was no
unwary innocent person.
[d. at 454.
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The court recognized that the entrapment issue has traditionally been given to the jury for consideration after instructions from the court based on this subjective approach. 7l While
the court continued to allow the defendant to elect to have this
defense decided by the jury, it also offered future defendants an
option. In its view, "entrapment should no longer be left in all
instances as a defense to be determined by the jury. .. [so]
that a proper balance may be struck between the obligations of
law enforcement and the rights of the accused who raises the
defense of entrapment. "72
According to Minnesota v. Griffie, therefore, the defendant
can either have the matter resolved by the jury or can, prior to
the commencement of trial, elect to have the claim of entrapment heard and decided by the court as a matter of law. After
giving notice of this election to the court and the prosecution
and setting forth the basis for the claim, the defendant can
present the argument at a pretrial evidentiary hearing similar to
a motion to suppress evidence. The trial judge then makes
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record.
If the court decides that defendant was entrapped into the commission of
the crime charged, this will be a bar to further prosecution for that
charge. The state may appeal this decision. If the court holds that there
was no entrapment, the issue is closed and defendant may not present
the defense to the jury. 13

The Minnesota approach is an unusual one, giving the defendant an option in determinations of questions of law and fact.
No empirical evidence has been offered to indicate how often
the process is utilized and whether a significant number of
defendants elect to have a court determination instead of the
more usual jury decision. The decision has not, however, been
broadly followed throughout the United States. In the vast
majority of states, the defendant is given no option concerning
these questions.
In determining whether the entrapment issue gets to the jury
in jurisdictions that utilize the subjective approach, the trial
judge normally must view the evidence on the two separate
questions: inducement by the government, and predisposition
71

ld. at 455 .

72 ld.

73 1d.
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of the defendant. If, of course, the defendant offers no evidence
of inducement, the entrapment defense will not come before the
jury. Thus, as indicated above, in most jurisdictions simply
demonstrating that an opportunity was created by the government for the commission of the crime will be insufficient to
satisfy the burden as to inducement. 74 The defendant, however,
rarely loses on this point. As noted by the Second Circuit , the
"defendant bears a 'relatively slight' burden in showing inducement. He need demonstrate only that the government initiated the crime. "75 The Ninth Circuit characterization was
similar. It referred to the fact that "only slight evidence is
needed to create a factual issue and get the defense to the
jury. "76
A few recent cases will demonstrate the ease with which the
defendant normally will sustain his burden. See, for instance ,
United States v. Knight 7 7 where the defendant was charged with
possession of a " sawed-off shotgun. "78 Defendant claimed that
he had been entrapped into selling the sawed-off shotgun. On
the matter of inducement, the court had little difficulty determining that sufficient evidence had been offered.
The defendant's testimony lwas1 that he offered to sell the weapon in
un sawed-off state , but that the government agent indicated on both the
first and second contact with the Defendant , that he would buy the
weapon only if it were sawed-off; the Defendant finally agreeing on the
second contact , after having first refused the agent's request to saw off
the barrel of the weapon, because he needed the money . 79

Gobin v. Texas 80 presents another interesting view of the
amount of evidence necessary to demonstrate inducement.
The defendant there was convicted of delivering amphetamines.
The contention for the defense was entrapment. The only evidence offered to demonstrate inducement which the court con-

74

See text accompanying notes 27-35 supra .

75

United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1983).

76

United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982).

77

604 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1985).

78

In violation of 26 U .S.C. §§ 586I(d), 5861(e), 5871.

79

604 F. Supp. at 986.

80

684 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1985).
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sidered 81 was the government agent's threat to withhold rent
money if the defendant did not sell the amphetamines to another
individual, an undercover officer. The court concluded that this
threat, while "far from conclusive evidence, "82 was sufficient
proof of entrapment to raise the issue.
If there is a difficulty with the showing of inducement, it is
almost always because of a court's reliance on the "unitary"
approach to the entrapment determination. That is, in a few
jurisdictions it is not enough for the defendant simply to demonstrate governmental inducement. 83 Instead-assuming the government has satisfied its burden-the defendant must offer
some "evidence negating the defendant's propensity to commit
the crime. "84 As the court in United States v. Mayo noted:
While jury determinations of this issue are favored , the defendant is not
automatically entitled to have the defense go to the jury whenever
inducement is shown . If the government' s evidence of propensity stands
uncontradicted , there is no factual issue for the jury to resolve and the
defense will not be submitted. 85

It is also true, however, that very little is needed even to
raise some doubt as to the predisposition, for the trial court
must examine the record ofthe case "in the light most favorable
to the defendant. "86 In addition, "any evidence negating propensity, whether in cross-examination or otherwise, requires
submission to the jury however unreasonable the judge would
consider a verdict in favor of defendant to be.' '87
81 The defendant also argued that the government agent threatened to withhold
drugs that the defendant needed for his own addiction unless he would sell drugs to
the undercover officer. The court, relying on prior precedent. held that such threats
to withhold drugs could not constitute evidence that would raise the issue of entrapment.
A promise to get a person high on dope is so unlikely to induce a person not
already so disposed, to commit the criminal offense charged as to not even raise
the issue of entrapment.
[d. at 804-805 (citing Bush v. Texas, 611 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tex. 1980».

82 The court asked the obvious question, "[why] didn't the appellant simply tell
the informant to sell his own drugs to his own friend?" 684 S.W.2d at 805.
8J

See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.

84 United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 509 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 597 (3d Cir. 1982).

85

705 F.2d 62, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1983).

86

United States v. Anglada, 524 F.2d 296, 298 (2d Cir. 1975).

87

United States v. Riley , 363 F.2d 955,959 (2d Cir. 1966).
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Cases do arise, though, where the defendant may be able to
demonstrate some government initiation, but may not be able to
show any negative evidence as to his preexisting intent to commit the crime. See, for example, United States v. Armocida 88
where the defendant was convicted of various drug offenses. 89
The court conceded that the facts arguably showed that government agents initiated the crime, but concluded "there was
no evidence negating any propensity on the part of [the defendant] to deal in narcotics.' '90 All the evidence in the case indicated the defendant was" a knowing and willing participant in
the transactions from the start. "91 In all conversations the
defendant readily replied that he would be able to obtain narcotics, that deadlines could be met, and that further meetings
with the government agents would solve any difficulties as to
the sale of the drugs. While there were numerous delays in
connection with the sale of drugs, the evidence indicated the
delays were "not due to any reluctance on [defendant's] part."
The defendant in that case did not take the stand but still •• could
have presented evidence negating propensity either through his
own testimony, by cross-examining government witnesses or
by any other means, but he failed to do so. "92
The Second Circuit set forth the "minimal" rule under the
unitary approach for preserving the defense.
[T Jo contradict the government's evidence of propensity , defendant
must offer some evidence that is on target, some evidence that raises an
issue of fact, however slight, concerning his propensity to commit the
crime. A shot in the dark will not do. We will not . .. require submission
of the defense despite overwhelming uncontradicted evidence of predispostition. While the accused need not meet the government's showing
with evidence of equal quantity and quality, he must at a minimum
address the government's showing.1J3
88

515 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1975).

89 Con spiring to distribute, distributing, and using a telephone to facilitate distribution of heroin.
90

515 F.2d at 55 .

91 [d. at 56. The facts here are to be contrasted with those in United States v.
Anglada, 524 F.2d 296, 297 (2d eir. 1975), where predisposition was established in
the government officer's testimony of the defendant's ready response to the inducement. There, however, the defense was preserved because the defendant cast doubt
on the credibility of the agent; he "offered a different version of the transaction."

92

515 F.2d at 56.

93

United States v. Mayo , 705 F.2d 62. 70 (2d Cir. 1983).
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The entrapment issues properly raised in a criminal trial are
particularly appropriate for jury consideration because so often
the issue of predisposition is one of credibility. In essence ,
many entrapment cases are disputes concerning who to believe,
the defendant or the government agent. Because the jury is
traditionally seen as the best judge of credibility, jurors properly
are given the determination concerning the question of predisposition in most courtS. 9 4 The trial court in United States v.
Lentz gave a fairly standard instruction dealing with this issue.
Where a person has no previous intent or purpose to violate the law, but
is induced or persuaded by law enforcement officers or their agents to
commit a crime , he is a victim of entrapment , and the law of matter of
policy forbids his conviction in such a case .
On the other hand , where a person already has the readiness and willingness to break the law, the mere fact that government agents provide
what appears to be a favorable opportunity is not entrapment.
If, then, the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that, before anything at all occurred regarding the
offenses charged in the indictment, the defendants ... were ready and
willing to commit the crime as charged in the indictment , whenever the
opportunity was afforded , and that law enforcement officers or their
agents did no more than offer the opportunity, then the jury should find
that the defendants . .. are not victims of entrapment.
On the other hand , if the evidence in the case should leave you with a
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendants had the previous intent or
purpose to commit the offense as charged, apart from the inducement or
persuasion of some law enforcement officers or agent of the government,
then it is your duty to find the defendants . . . not guilty. 95

Ultimately, as is readily apparent, "the key to an entrapment defense is the accused's predisposition to commit the
crime. "96 There will be cases , however, in which the trial court
cannot allow the entrapment issue to go before the jury because
a finding in favor of the defendant must be made as a matter of
law.
In jurisdictions that utilize the subjective test, if there is
sufficient evidence to get to the jury, when the defendant raises
94 See generally United States v. Rogers, 639 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Lentz, 624 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373
(3d Cif. 1978).
93

624 F.2d at 1286-1287 & n.8.

96/d. at 1286.
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the entrapment defense, the judge can nevertheless decide the
matter as a question oflaw. This decision oflaw normally arises
in one of two contexts: the evidence is indisputable with respect
to a lack of predisposition, or the government conduct is so
extreme as to require a verdict on the entrapment issue for the
defendant. Because the issues are so very different under these
two approaches, they will be treated separately.
Indisputable Evidence of Lack of Predisposition

Two recent cases have set forth the standard for a decision
of law on behalf of the defendant. The Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen 97 made clear that such a decision
required uncontested evidence as to lack of predisposition. "In
order to show that entrapment exists as a matter of law, there
must be undisputed testimony making it patently clear that an
otherwise innocent person was induced to commit the act complained of by trickery, persuasion, or fraud of a government
agent. "98
The state approach is illustrated by a recent opinion of the
Arizona Court of Appeals: "Entrapment is a question for the
jury unless there is no evidence to support the defense or unless
97

754 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1985).

981d. at 821. See also United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
den.ied, 429 U.S. 854; United States v. Abushi, 682 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982). In some
recent cases from the Eleventh Circuit, mention has been made, in dicta, "that the
doctrine of entrapment as a matter of law did not survive the Supreme Court's
opinion in Hampton v. United States . ... " United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d
1491, 1499 (lith Cir. 1985). The difficulty with this statement is that it simply is not a
correct construction of the law. The statement in Andrews relies on a similar statement in United States v. Struuf, 701 F.2d 875, 877 n.6 (11th Cir. 1983), which in tum
relies on a footnote in United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1240 n.5 (5th Cir.
1978). The court in RodriRuez, however, was much more careful in its characterization of the Supreme Court's holding in Hampton:
In Bueno, this court held that entrapment is established as a matter of law
whenever the contraband in question is supplied to the defendant by a government agent, even where the defendant is predisposed. Bileno was effectively
overruled by Hampton v. United Stales.
Thus, the Rodriguez court merely noted that the supply of drugs as such would not
constitute entrapment as a matter oflaw, not that the entire doctrine of entrapment as
a matter of law was no longer valid. The correct view of the principle was stated by
the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1985):
In essence, the jury must find that the defendant's culpable intent originated with
the defendant and was not the result of acts of government agents. Thus, to
declare entrapment as a matter of law requires the conclusion that a reasonable
jury could not find that the government discharged its burden of proof.
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uncontradicted testimony makes it clear that an otherwise innocent person has been induced to commit criminal acts. "9'J
The defense motion with respect to entrapment as a matter
of law can only be resolved by a thorough and careful review of
the evidence concerning inducement, the degree of pressure
utilized, and predisposition. The process is a difficult but important one.
Defense Motion Granted

In United States v. McLernon, 100 the defendants were convicted of conspiracy in connection with cocaine sales. One
defendant contended that the evidence as to lack of predisposition was beyond dispute. The court began by noting that the
issue of entrapment normally is properly submitted to the jury .
.. If, [however,] the facts pertaining to that issue are not in real
dispute, the question of entrapment may be taken from the jury
[and decided 'as a matter of law']. "101
In order for the entrapment case to reach the jury, the
government must present evidence from which the jurors could
decide that the defendant was predisposed to break the law
prior to the time that he received the opportunity given by the
government officers. 102 The court stated that in determining the
question as a matter of law it would have to view the evidence
"in the light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all
reasonable inferences therefrom in its favor." 103 The question
then becomes whether any reasonable juror could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed

99

State v. Gessler, 690 P.2d 98, 101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).

100

746 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1984).

IO I

Id. at 1111.

I02Id. (citing, among other cases, United States v. Hodge, 539 F.2d 898 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091; United States v. Jones, 575 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1978); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1973». The court also
referred to the Sherman case where the Supreme Court concluded that the government's predisposition evidence had not been sufficient and that entrapment could be
determined as a matter of law. Another construction of the Sherman case is also
possible, fOCUSing on the outrageous behavior of the government officers. See text
accompanying notes 123-126 infra.
103

746 F.2d at III J.
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to commit the crime. In relying on cases from other courts,104
the court stated that the key question is whether the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime "before coming into contact with the government." lOS
[The factors relevant to determining a defendant's prior disposition
include] the character or reputation of the defendant, including any prior
criminal record; whether the suggestion of the criminal activity was
initially made by the Government; whether the defendant was engaged
in the criminal activity for profit; whether the defendant evidenced
reluctance to commit the offense, overcome only by repeated Government inducement or persuasion; and the nature of the inducement or
persuasion supplied by the Government. 106

In the McLernon case, the government presented no evidence of the character or reputation of the defendant, no showing of a prior criminal record, and the evidence demonstrated
quite clearly that the government officer initiated the contact.
The defendant was resistant at first and then an unrelated
profit-motivating "inducement" was created by the government
agent, finally persuading the defendant to go along with the
criminal activity.107 It was only after repeated personal contacts
that the defendant, a "hard working" delivery man who had
volunteered his time in numerous public activities, committed
the crime. The court concluded that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law.
On the record before us , we find no evidence that (defendant's] character or reputation inclined him toward criminal activity , no evidence that
[heJ initiated the criminal activity, no evidence that [he] readily accepted
the opportunity presented by [the] government agent, and no evidence

104 See , e.g. , United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Reynoso-Ul1oa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th CiT. 1977), cert. denied. 436 U.S. 926.
lOS

746 F.2d at 1112; see also United States v. Townsend, 555 F.2d 152 (7th Cir.

1977), cerl. denied. 434 U.S. 897.
106

[d.

107 The Court was particularly troubled by the government officer's establishment
of an extremely close relationship with the defendant so as to later use that relationship to exert influence in causing the criminal behavior.
Yaqui and Hamlin became so close that they performed the Indian ritual of
becoming " blood brothers .... " Agent Hamlin and Yaqui frequently called each
other "blood brother." Hamlin, in fact, introduced Yaqui to his family by stating,
"here's my blood brother; he's going to be one of the family ; treat him just like
the family. "
746 F.2d at 1113.
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that [he) would have committed this crime absent the overwhelming
strength of [the] agent ' s inducement. We find instead that [thej agent
induced an unwary and innocent man into committing crimes he was not
predisposed to commit by becoming his " blood brother" and preying
upon the love and loyalty ofthat special relationship .... [W]e conclude
that the government presented no evidence from which a reasonable
juror could have concluded that [defendant] was predisposed to conspire
to violate the narcotics laws. 108

The defendants in United States v. Dion 109 were Indians
living in one of the poorest parts of the United States with an
extremely high unemployment rate and a very low annual income. They were convicted of selling government agents such
protected birds as eagles. The government offered no evidence
that one of the defendants, Fool BuB, was predisposed to commit the crime other than the fact that the government made an
offer to purchase a bird from the defendant and that he accepted
the offer with little hesitation. The defense, however, pointed to
the fact that the government's undercover operation continued
in this impoverished area for over two years and involved
government agents on numerous occasions making extremely
profitable offers of illicit activity to very poor residents of the
area. Moreover, the defendant had but one transaction with the
government and "the tape of this transaction reflects that Fool
Bull had never sold a protected bird before and was quite naive
as to the proper price for an eagle and what the 'traders' would
do with it." 110 The court recognized that the entrapment defense is "relatively limited" and does not give the federal
judiciary a " chancellor's foot" veto over disagreeable law enforcement practices. IliOn the nature of the evidence, however,
it expressed real concern over whether the defendant's "actions
I08Id. at 1114.
109

762 F.2d 674 (8th eir. 1985).

IIOld. at 691.
II lId. (quoting Justice Rehnquist's opinion in the Russell case, 411 U.S. at 435).
The court went on, however, to quote an earlier decision.
[T]he line must be drawn where, as here, a government agent lures the unwary
innocent and then implants a law-breaking disposition that was not theretofor
present. In such cases the government takes on the unwholesome appearance of
the consummate manufacturer of crime. The continuing vitality and integrity of
our" government of laws" would be imperiled if we sanctioned the manufacturing
of crime by those responsible for upholding and enforcing the law.
762 F.2d at 691.
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were completely the result of a government undercover operation which had carried on too long." Ultimately , the court held
that "the evidence shows that Fool Bull was entrapped as a
matter of law. No reasonable juror could have found beyond
reasonable doubt that Fool Bull was ready and wil1ing to commit the crimes, and that the agents did no more than afford him
an opportunity to do SO." 1 12
Defense Motion Denied

Perhaps the leading case in this area-and one of the leading
cases on the entire law of entrapment-is United States v.
Jannotti. 11 3 There, the Third Circuit, en banc, considered one of
the actions resulting from the government operation known as
ABSCAM where FBI agents posed as employees of a fictional
corporation and created opportunities "for illicit conduct by
public officials predisposed to political corruption. " 11 4 The
particular defendants involved in the case were found guilty of
conspiring to obstruct interstate commerce llS and conspiring to
violate the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization statute. 1 16 The two defendants were members of the Philadelphia
City Council and were shown to have taken this "sting" money
in exchange for promises of exerting influence on behalf of the
givers of the money. One of the principal issues on appeal was
the defense's entrapment argument. The district court had submitted the issue of entrapment to the jury following the usual
jury instructions dealing with the subjective approach. After the
jury decided that the defendants had not been entrapped , the
district court nevertheless granted the defendant's motion for
acquittal, finding that the evidence was, "as a matter of law,
insufficient to establish the defendants ' predisposition beyond a
reasonable doubt. " 11 7
The basic question in Jannotti was whether the government
may show predisposition simply by the acceptance of the
112

Id. at 692.

113

673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert. denied. 457 U .S. 406.

114

Jd. at 581.

113

18 U .S.C. § 1951(a).

116

R.Le.O. Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).

117

Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 598.
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money itself, a proposition denied by the trial judge. By focusing on several factors, the appeals court concluded that the
government had proved precisely this, beyond a reasonble
doubt. The court determined that the sizes of the payments
($30,000 to one defendant and $10,000 to another) were not so
large .. in today' s inflationary times . .. as to overcome an
official's natural reluctance to accept a bribe." 118 Thus, these
figures were not so high as to weigh against predisposition in
favor of entrapment. Moreover, the two defendants, both pu blic
officials , clearly knew that the payments were bribes to be used
in exchange for exerting improper influence on the rest of the
Philadelphia council. As a consequence , the majority determined that the defense could not prevail as a matter of law.
The ultimate factual decisions in an entrapment case must be left to the
jury. Where , as here, the jury was uniquely equipped to inquire into the
calculus of human interaction, the court should not interfere with its
conclusions, We conclude that in determining that the defendants were
entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the ground of entrapment as a
matter of law the district court impermissibly substituted its own determination of the credibility of witnesses , the weight of the evidence and
the inferences to be drawn from the evidence for that of the jury.1 19
Extreme Government Conduct

This branch of the legal question is quite different from the
usual entrapment claimed resolved as a matter oflaw. It is often
linked closely to the due process concerns discussed else1181d. at 599.
119 [d. at 606. Judge Aldisert wrote a lengthy dissent challenging a number of the
fundamental premises of the ml\iority. In particular, he questioned the deference to
be given to the jurors as fact finders in entrapment cases.
The ml\iority all allow the entrapment question in this case to be resolved by a lay
jury. As staunchly as I believe the jury, reflecting the conscience of the community , should be society's instrument for resolving controverted facts once a
minimum legal threshold has been established, I stoutly believe also that the jury,
untrained in the law, should never be called upon to design and construct that
threshold . . .. Defining the precise division of authority in the judge-jury relationship is always a sensitive and delicate responsibility. Where the defense of
entrapment is interposed, however, responsibility is appreciably intensified. The
mere submission to thejury may present the jury with a Hobson' s choice as to the
defendant, because the entrapment defense requires the defendant to admit the
commission of deeds which, but for their inducement by the government, would
constitute the commission of a crime.
Id. at 614; see generally United States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1077-1078 (5th CiT.
1985).
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where. 120 For instance, the Eighth Circuit noted that where the
government's conduct is so outrageous or fundamentally unfair
the defendant may be deprived of due process of law, or the
courts may be moved . 'in the exercise of their supervisory
jurisdiction over the administration of criminal justice to hold
that the defendant was ·entrapped' as a matter of law." 121 The
court in that case went on to note that such an entrapment
argument involving outrageous government involvement simply
presents no issue of fact for the jury to decide, it is entirely a
question of law for the court. Because the legal question here is
necessarily linked to the due process considerations, an
extended discussion of the subject is not appropriate. 122 Still,
it is important to note that there is much in the famous Sherman 123 case to provide a basis for a ruling of entrapment as a
matter of law.
The defendant in Sherman was convicted of the sale of
narcotics. The government agent 124 first met him at a doctor's
office where both were being treated for narcotics addiction.
After numerous requests were denied for the purchase of narcotics, the defendant finally succumbed to the request of the
agent. Chief Justice Warren had little doubt that the defendant
had been induced to commit the crime and that the evidence
with respect to predisposition was marginal. 125 Thus, one reading of the case is that the Court decided that the government
simply had not shouldered its burden of proving predisposition
beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, much ofthe language
in the case appears to be connected to the due process, outrageous conduct argument discussed above. One of the most often
quoted paragraphs from the case is right on point.
120

See generally Park, note I supra.

121 United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640, 648 (8th Cir. 1976); see generally United
States v. McCaghren, 666 F.2d 1227, 1230 nn.5-7 (8th Cir. 1981).

122 For an excellent discussion of this point, see Cruz v. Florida, 465 So. 2d 516,
518-520 (Fla. 1985).

123

356 U.S. 369 (1958).

124 The government agent was apparently operating as a "free agent" but the
court made clear that the government could not "disown" him or "insist it is not
responsible for his actions." [d. at 373. There were numerous instances of involvement by the government official with this agent connecting the two together.

125 The evidence of predisposition was weak. The defendant was reluctant and
slow to respond to the agent's offers, and the only prior convictions in the area were a
nine-year-old sales conviction and a five-year-old possession conviction. /d. at 375.
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The case at bar illustrates an evil that the defense of entrapment is
designed to overcome. The government informer entices someone attempting to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal saJe but
also into returning to the habit of use . Selecting the proper time , the
informer then tells the government agent. The set-up is accepted by the
agent without even a question as to the manner in which the informer
encountered the seller. Thus, the Government plays on the weaknesses
of an innocent party and beguiles him into committing crimes which he
otherwise would not have attempted. Law enforcement does not require
methods such as this. 126
The Objective Test

The traditional view of the objective test for entrapment
involves a judicial determination of the key questions. Most
courts have taken this view based on the notion that the purpose
of the doctrine of entrapment is not to determine the individual's culpability, but rather to apply public policy so as to
preserve the purity of the judicial system. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting in the Sh erman case, put the matter forcefully:
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his
conduct fall s outside the proscription of the statute , but because , even if
his guilt be admitted , the methods employed on behalf ofthe government
to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced .... Insofar as they
are used as instrumentalities in the administration of criminal justice , the
federal courts have an obligation to set their face against enforcement of
the law by lawless means or means that violate rationally vindicated
standards of justice, and refuse to sustain such method by effectuating
them .. . . Public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of
justice , upon which ultimately depends the rule of law , is the transcending value at stake. 127

Because of this idea of an entrapment defense linked to
public policy and the preservation of the propriety of the judicial system , the principal Supreme Court opinions espousing
the objective view consistently declare that the courts , not the
juries, should consider the entrapment issue. Justice Roberts in
Sorrells:
The doctrine rests , rather, on a fundamental rule of public policy. The
protection of its own functions and the preservation of the purity of its
own temple belongs only to the court. It is the province of the court and
126

Id. at 376.

m 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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of the court alone to protect itself and the government from such prostitution of the criminal law. The violation of the principles of justice by
the entrapment of the unwary into crime should be dealt with by the
court no matter by whom or at what stage of the proceedings the facts
are brought to its attention. 128

Justice Frankfurter in Sherman:
[S]uch a judgment, aimed at blocking off areas of impermissible police
conduct, is appropriate for the court and not for the jury .... [AJ jury
verdict, although it may settle the issue of entrapment in the particular
case, cannot give significant guidance for official conduct for the future .
Only the court, through the gradual evolution of explicit standards in
accumulated precedence, can do this with a degree of certainty that the
wise administration of criminal justice demands. 129

Justice Stewart dissenting in the Russell case:
[T]he question is whether-regardless of the predisposition of the particular defendant involved---the government agents have acted in such a
way as is likely to instigate or create a criminal offense . Under this
approach, the determination of the lawfulness of the Government's
conduct must be made-as it is on all questions involving the legality of
law enforcement methods-by the trial judge, not the jury .130

Several of the state courts that follow the objective standard
also rely on the principle that the determinations are properly
for the judge, not the jury. As stated by the Alaska Supreme
Court in Grossman v. Alaska, 131 the issue is a question to be
determined by the court and not the jury ... [I]t is obvious that
the issue of entrapment can be litigated either before or during
trial and should be determined by the court and not the jury. "
Perhaps the leading state case advocating the judicial determination of the entrapment question is Michigan v. D'Angelo. 132 There, the Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed the view
that the objective standard is based on the position that the
court, not the jury, ought to consider the broad policy questions
involved in an entrapment defense. This determination was said
to transcend the particular guilt or innocence of the defen128

287 U.S. at 457.

129

356 U.S. at 385.

0
1)

411 U.S. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

131

457 P.2d 226, 230 (Alaska 1969).

m 257 N.W.2d 655 (Mich. 1977).
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dant. 133 The court went on, however, to point to the practical
reason why the judge, not the jury, should consider the entrapment issue.134 The court was concerned preliminarily with a
lack of guidance given by jury verdicts:
A jury verdict of guilty provides no evaluation of the challenged police
conduct in the case and gives no guidance by which to measure the
propriety offuture official conduct. Similarly, a verdict of not guilty fails
to disclose whether the police conduct challenged in the case was found
to be impermissible or that the prosecution simply failed to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 135

A judicial resolu tion, of course, may' ' through an accumulation of cases, lprovide] a body of precedent which will stand as
a point of reference both for law enforcement officials and the
courts. "136 Ultimately, however, the court's chief concern was
that ajury simply could not at the same time consider evidence
establishing the guilt for a given crime and determine that entrapment occurred with respect to such evidence.

1 n The policy considerations which moved us to adopt the objective test of
entrapment compel with equal force the conclusion that the judge and not the jury
must determine its existence. The thesis is that law enforcement conduct which
essentially manufactures crime is a corruptive use of governmental authority
which, when used to obtain a conviction, taints the judiciary which tolerates its
use. It is a practice which relies for its success upon judicial indifference, if not
approval, and it must be deterred. Its deterrence is a duty which transcends the
determination of guilt or innocence in a given case and stands ultimately as the
responsibility of an incorruptible judiciary.

Id. al 658.
134 Aside from the forceful policy considerations which dictate judicial vigilance
in guarding against and precluding the use of improper law enforcement tactics in
the judicial process, there are pragmatic reasons why the duty should not be
passed along to the jury.

Id . at 659.

1351d.
136

/d. ; but see Park, note I supru, at 226-227:

(Sjupporters of the [objective] test usually advocate that the defense of entrapment be tried before the judge instead of the jury, so that a set of detailed
standards can develop as judges write opinions dealing with specific fact situations.
Even with time and experience, development of detailed rules will probably prove
to be quite difficult . . .. [ljt is . . . difficult to establish standardized procedures
for the delicate process of investigation and detection. Officers and informers
need to be able to respond differently to the multifarious situations with which
they will be presented.
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[E]vidence pertaining to guilt is likely to infect a jury determination of
the voluntariness of a confession [and] has an equal and analogous
application to jury determination of entrapment.
Just as in the determination of the voluntariness of an alleged confession, determination by the trial court of the entrapment issue will insure
that the jury' s verdict is free from the taint of undue and unnecessary
prejudice which might well be generated by the concomitant duty to
decide voluntariness in the confession case or the propriety of police
conduct in the entrapment case. 137

Given the chief rationale for the objective entrapment test as
being one of public policy, it is not surprising that the minority
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and a number of courts
following this approach have determined that the matter is
properly heard by the judge and not the jury,I38 Some states ,
however, that have adopted the objective test have decided that
the entrapment question should be given to the jury and not to
the judge. 139 In these courts, the judges focus on the objective
test as evaluating the sort of conduct that might cause the
average citizen to become a lawbreaker. With that in mind, the
determination can properly be viewed as ajury matter. Perhaps
the leading case on point is Iowa v. Mullen. 140
It has been persuasively urged courts must strike down " the use of their
process to consummate a wrong" [citing Justice Roberts opinion in
137 D' Angelo, 257 N. W .2d at 659 (referring to the procedure for determining
voluntariness of a confession stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964)) .
The jury, however, may find it difficult to understand the policy forbidding
reliance upon a coerced, but true confession, a policy which has divided this
Court in the past and an issue which may be reargued in the jury room. That a
trustworthy confession must also be voluntary if it is to be used at all, generates
natural and potent pressure to find it voluntary. Otherwise the guilty defendant
goes free. Objective consideration of the conflicting evidence concerning the
circumstances of the confession becomes difficult and the implicit findings become suspect.
378 U.S. at 382-383.

138 The Model Penal Code position on this is clear because it refers to the burden
being on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
conduct complained of occurred in response to entrapment. "The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the Court in the absence of the jury. " Model Penal Code § 2.13
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). The position is the same in the proposed revised
Federal Criminal Code, see text accompanying note 53 supra.
139 Except, of course, in cases where the judge can resolve the matter as a
question of law because the facts are so clear.
140

216 N .W.2d 375 , 382 (Iowa 1974).
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Sorrells, supra]. Others have observed the defense will frequently pose
evidentiary conflicts peculiarly suited to jury determination. Certainly
the jury can weigh conduct which might induce "a normally law abiding
person " to commit a crime as surely as it can weigh (in a tort case) the
required conduct of a "reasonably prudent person."

The court noted that while there may be instances in which the
trial judge should make the determination of entrapment as a
matter of law,141 generally the issue will be submitted to the
jury.142

Inconsistent Defenses
The traditional, and prevailing, view has been that a defendant cannot raise inconsistent defenses in the entrapment area.
Courts consistently hold that "it would be inconsistent and
confusing to allow a defendant to contend in one breath that he
did not commit the crime, and in the next breath that he was
entrapped into committing it." 143
A number of jurisdictions do not, however, accept this view.
Moreover, even in those jurisdictions that do accept this view,
there has been considerable confusion as to creating "exceptions" to the rule and also as to defining when it is that an
inconsistent defense is raised. 144 This article turns first to the
141 We hold the trial court shall determine the question as a matter oflaw where
there is no dispute as to the facts or the inferences to be drawn from them but
shall submit the issue to the jury where the defense is properly raised and there is
a dispute in the evidence relating to the operative facts where the inferences to be
drawn therefrom.
Jd.

142 For other states that utilize an objective test (typically based on the Model
Penal Code) but give the basic question to the jury, see Hawaii v. Kelsey, 566 P.2d
1370 (Hawaii 1970); California v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 956 n.6 (Cal. 1979); New
Hampshire v. Bacon, 319 A.2d 636 (N.H. 1974).
143 United States v. Sears, 343 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1965).
144 The practical impact of the inconsistent defense rule is somewhat unclear. As
pointed out by Professor Groot, in many cases:
[T] he defendant would be ill-ad vised as a matter of tactics to deny that the act was
done. To make that denial in the face of overwhelming proof simply destroys
whatever credibility the defendant might have had when he gave his version of the
entrapment facts. This is not to say that the present application of the inconsistency rule to single-element crimes is legally supportable; it is merely to say that
the class of cases in which it would be practical for the defendant to use both the
defenses is so miniscule as to be unimportant.
Groot, note 1 supra, at 254, 263.
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rejection of the inconsistent defense, then to those courts that
accept the principle, and finally to the situations in which the
principle may not apply even in the majority of jurisdictions.
It is not too surprising that courts that have adopted the
objective test have been more likely to reject the inconsistent
defense notion. 145 There are several explanations for this. First,
this principle of allowing inconsistent defenses is in accord with
the prevailing view in civil procedure l46 and the commonly
accepted view in criminal cases as well. 147 More important,
however, is the basic foundation for the objective defense. As
noted by one court, the objective view has as its purpose a
policy "to discourage untoward government involvement in the
manufacture of crime; entrapment excuses the commission of
acts that would otherwise constitute a crime. Thus, entrapment
is a special defense addressed to the court, the function of
which is akin to that of the exclusionary rule." 148 Because the
basis of the objective principle is a focus on government conduct, the defendant's conduct becomes somewhat irrelevant.
The Brown Commission made this point clearly. "The [defenseJ
is designed to permit the defendant simultaneously to deny that
he committed the offense and to claim an entrapment. The
section, therefore, allows the defendant to plead inconsistent
defenses."149 A broader explanation was given in perhaps the
most famous opinion justifying the rejection of the inconsistent
defense "doctrine."
In California v. Perez, 150 Chief Justice Traynor rejected the
government's position that in order to invoke the defense of
entrapment the defendant would have to admit committing the
criminal acts charged. In some detail, he explained his position.
Although the defense is available to a defendant who is otherwise guilty,
it does not follow that the defendant must admit guilt to establish the
defense. A defendant, for example, may deny that he committed every

145

Groot, note 1 supra, at 259.

146

See generally C.A. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 1283, at 368, 372.
141

Groot, note 1 supra, at 259.

148

United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981,983 n.l (9th Cir. 1975).

149

Brown Commission, note 34 supra, working papers at 325.

150

401 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1%5).
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element of the crime charged, yet properly allege that such acts as he
did commit were induced by law enforcement officers. Moreover, a
defendant may properly contend that the evidence shows unlawful
police conduct amounting to entrapment without conceding that it also
shows his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When the evidence does
show such conduct, the court has a duty to root its effects out of the trial
upon its own initiative if necessary. Entrapment is recognized as a
defense because "the court refuses to enable officers of the law to
consummate illegal or unjust schemes designed to foster rather than
prevent and detect crime." A rule designed to deter such unlawful
conduct cannot properly be restricted by compelling a defendant to
incriminate himself as a condition to invoking the rule. Thus, the defendant may challenge the legality of a search and seizure without admitting
that the property seized was taken from him and without asserting a
proprietary interest in the premises entered. To compel a defendant to
admit guilt as a condition to invoking the defense of entrapment would
compel him to relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt at the risk of not being able to meet his
burden of proving entrapment. To put the defendant in that dilemma
would frustrate the assertion of the defense itself and would thus undermine its policy,, 51

The rejection of the inconsistency defense idea in objective
test jurisdictions is not surprising. What is, however, somewhat
more surprising is its rejection in some courts that follow the
subjective test for entrapment. Perhaps the leading case on
point is United States v. Demma. 152 There, the Ninth Circuit, en
bane, considered the basic question, noting that the theory behind it was that it is "factually inconsistent for defendant to
deny the crime charged and, at the same time, to claim entrapment."I SJ The court gave two reasons for its rejection of the
inconsistent defense rule. The first was its view that such a rule
conflicted with the Supreme Court's cases enforcing the enISl/d. at 937-938. The CaJifomia Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in California v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947,956 (CaJ. 1979): "[A] defendant need not admit his guilt,
or even commission of the act, to raise a defense of entrapment." The court went on
inBarraza to make c1earthat the proper test of entrapment in CaJifomia would be the
objective principle: "Was the conduct of the law enforcement agent likely to induce a
normally law abiding citizen to commit the offense?" Id. at 955.
15 2

523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane).

I S) Id. at 982. The court cited its principaJ prior holding in the area which
explained the previous rule. "Appellants, to say the least, take a very inconsistent
position in this respect. Appellants have maintained throughout that they did not
commit a crime. It logically follows that absent the commission of a crime there can
be no entrapment. The triaJ court understood this situation and very properly refused
to inject into the case a question which could have no other result than to confuse."
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trapment doctrine. In particular, the court looked to the opinion
in the Sorrells case. It found that the theory of the Supreme
Court there was that "the acts necessary to constitute any
federal crime must be non-entrapped acts; non-entrapment is an
essential element of every federal crime which is put in issue
whenever evidence is introduced suggesting that an unpredisposed defendant was induced by the government to commit the
acts charged. "154 By requiring the defendant to concede the
state of mind at issue, the court concluded, the government
would be relieved of the burden of proving that the defendant
had the mental element necessary under the statute. "[The inconsistent defense rule] relieves the Government of this burden
whenever the crime charged involves a mental element which
the defendant refuses to concede. (Thus], relieving the Government of the burden of proving that the necessary acts were
nonentrapped conflicts fundamentally with the Sorrells conception of entrapment. "ISS
The court recognized that the government may not only
have induced the acts required, but also the "scienter." More
broadly, however, the court went on to find that there was no
rationale for the inconsistent defense doctrine in entrapment
cases where it would not be present in other cases.
It is well established that a defendant in a criminal prosecution may
assert inconsistent defenses. The rule in favor of inconsistent defenses
reflects the belief of a modern criminal jurisprudence that a criminal
defendant should be accorded every reasonable protection in defending
himself against governmental prosecution. That established policy bespeaks a healthy regard for circumscribing the Government's opportunities for invoking the criminal sanction.

The [entrapment] inconsistency theory is an exception to the rule in
favor of inconsistent defenses. But it is an exception without any justification. There is no conceivable reason for permitting a defendant to
assert inconsistent defenses in other contexts but denying him that right
in the context of entrapment. Indeed, there is a compelling reason for

154 [d. at 983. The court went on to quote Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in
Sorrells. which appeared to expressly reject the inconsistence defense notion.
The defense is available not in the view of the accused though guilty may go free ,
but that the government cannot be permitted to contend that he is guilty of a crime
where the government officials are the instigators of his conduct.
Id.

ISS

/d . at 983-984.
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not making an exception of the entrapment defense. The primary func~
tion of entrapment is to safeguard the integrity of the law enforcement
and prosecution process. 156

The most recent major case rejecting the inconsistent defense principle is the Fifth Circuit's decision, en bane, in United
States v. Henry. 157 There, the court focused on the "usual"
inconsistent defense case. That is, the case in which the defendant does not truly contest that certain acts were taken,ls8 but
instead contends that the government never proved that he had
the appropriate state of mind under the statute, wholly apart
from any entrapment contention. The court concluded:
[It would bel entirely consistent with the nature of the jury function and
with the nature of the entrapment defense to require the jury to consider
both the existence and the quality of the defendant's alleged intent. Nor
do we believe that in the light of values thereby advanced that it is
impermissibly inconsistent for an accused both to claim that his admitted
acts were without criminal intent , but that nevertheless any act he so
committed was induced by governmental entrapment. 1 S 9

It focused its attention on the principle of entrapment being
linked to the question of predisposition, "the origin of the
criminal intent in issue. " 160 That issue would consistently be
one for the jury . 'whether he was predisposed to commit the
charged crime , i.e. , whether, focusing on the period before the
commencement of the charged criminal episode, one can say
that the criminal intent or design originated with government
agents , is also a jury issue."161
The court noted that entrapment asks one key question,
"What was in the defendant's mind before he did the charged
acts? " The other key question, however, in most cases, is what
was in the defendant's mind at the time he committed the acts?
It is , then, not too inconsistent for a defendant to testify that he did not
have the criminal intent required for conviction and then, through his
IS6 Id. at 985.
15 7

749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane).

IS8 It would be the rare case , indeed , where the defendant would claim that he
did not commit any of the acts alleged in the indictment. Such a case would normally
involve misidentification, hardly the chief basis of most entrapment claim cases.

159

749 F.2d at 211.

160/d.
16 1

at 213.

[d.
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lawyer's argument and the court's instruction on the law, to urge the
jury, in the event it rejects his personal view concerning intent, to find
that the evidence requires acquittal on the basis of the entrapment
doctrine .. . . Our holding is rooted in the fact that criminal intent is a
"subjective determination," an "issue for the jury to resolve on the
basis of circumstantial evidence under the totality of the circumstances. " ... [I]ntent necessarily has an amorphous and subjective quality that permits reasonable people , even the defendant and the jurors ,
fairly to disagree over whether his intent was criminal at the time the act
was committed. Accordingly, it is not inconsistent with a criminal trial's
"moral content and ... ultimate concern with guilt or innocence," to
instruct the jury to evaluate the entrapment issue , should it disbelieve a
defendant' s denial of criminal intent. 162

The historical precedent of the inconsistency rule is not
entirely clear. Probably, the earliest use occurred a century ago
in People v. Murn 163 where the defendant was accused of selling
whiskey to government officers. The court explicitly denied
consideration of the entrapment defense-offered alternatively
by the defendant. "Defendant is in no position to urge that the
act complained of was induced by entrapment of the officers ,
for he claims he made no sale .... If it be found that he made
the sale he cannot urge the defense of entrapment in exculpation
of his act."164
Another early case is Nutter v. United States. 165 There, the
defendant not only denied that he provided morphine to a government informer, but also asserted the entrapment argument.
The court did not hesitate to reject this view.
Such contention ignores, not only his own testimony that all of Williams '
story was false , but the evidence of Williams that he bought drugs from
162 Henry, 749 F.2d at 213-214. The dissenting judges focused primarily on the
mlijority's view that the two defenses were not inconsistent.
To have sustained that defense in Henry's case then , the jury would have been
required, not only to disbelieve Henry's sworn testimony that he acted without
the specific intent that forms the core and cruciaJ element of the offense with
which he was charged, but to believe instead, not only that Henry acted with
precisely the specific intent that he swore he did not harbor, but that the intent
which he swore he did not have, originated with the government. In short, Henry
claims the right to swear that he had no criminal intent and in the same breath to
argue that he had one that did not originate with him.
Id. at 214.

163 190 N.W.

666 (1882).

1641d.
165

289 Fed. 484 (1923).
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the defendant a hundred times before. Under such circumstances there
was nothing of illegitimate entrapment or procurement in the government inspector' s sending him to make the 101st purchase under conditions which would enable the United States to offer corroborative proof
that the sale had been made. 166

The majority of cases consistently takes the view that if the
defendent has denied the commission of the acts constituting
the crime, he cannot raise the entrapment defense. 167 One recent case made the point forcefully.
[0 Jne may not claim he was entrapped into a criminal act without first
admitting that , he did, in fact commit it. A criminal prosecution such as
this is not a game. It incorporates a moral content and an ultimate
concern with guilt or innocence that are inconsistent with permitting the
accused to say, "I didn' t do it, but if! did, the government tricked me into
it. " 168

In response to the argument that the inconsistent defense
doctrine should not be applied in the entrapment area, as it is
generally not applied elsewhere in the criminal area, some
courts have gone out of their way to find that the entrapment
context is different. See, for example, United States v. Smith 16Y
where the point was discussed.
The doctrine facilitates the truth-finding function of a criminal trial and
saves the prosecutor from presenting essentially two cases against the
defendant , one relating to the offense and the other relating to predisposition prior to the offense . " the unusual nature of the entrapment
defense, focusing on the state of mind of the defendant prior to commission of the offense justifies this requirement.

Some courts still follow closely the traditional view regarding inconsistent defenses in criminal cases where the key defense is entrapment. In these courts, the defendant may be
166

!d. at 485.

167 See. e.g., Illinois v. Gould, 478 N.E .2d 553 (Ill. 1985); see generally Groot,
note 1 supra; Note. "Denial of the Crime and the Availability of the Entrapment
Defense in the Federal Courts," 22 B.C.L. Rev. 911 (1981); Comment, "Assertion of
Inconsistent Defenses in Entrapment Cases, " 1975 Utah L. Rev. 962; United States
v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1170-1172 & nn. 12-18 (2d Cir. 1980).
168 United States v. Rey , 706 F.2d 145, 147 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 764
U.S. 1038. This ruling, of course, would no longer appear to have significant
precedential value as a result of the Fifth Circuit 's en banc decision in the H enry
case , 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. J984) (en banc).
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757 F.2d 1161,1167-1168 (lIth Cir. J985).
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required to affirmatively make admissions l70 and these admissions will have to go to all key elements of the offenses charged.
Several recent cases demonstrate the point. In United States v.
Ranzoni, 171 the defendant was charged with receiving liquor
that had been stolen from an interstate shipment. 172 He made
two claims regarding the charge. First, he said that he did not
know the goods were stolen. Second, he claimed he had been
entrapped into committing the crime by a government agent.
The court rejected the defense contention summarily.
We finally have no difficulty in disposing of [his] entrapment argument.
[He) failed to admit each and every element of the § 2315 violation with
which he was charged, a necessary prerequisite to raising an entrapment
defense. Since [he) did not admit that he knew the liquor was stolen, he
could not assert his entrapment defense at trial and cannot raise it on
appeal. 173

The Third Circuit made the statement even more explicit by
noting that the entrapment "defense requires admission of guilt
of the crime charged and all of its elements, including the
required mental state. "174
Perhaps the court to most strictly follow the inconsistent
defense principle is the Arizona Supreme Court. In Arizona v.
Nilsen,17 5 the court noted that it had "consistently held that to
avail himself of the defense of entrapment, a defendant must
admit all the elements of the offense." 176 Presumably recognizing the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination implications of a
requirement that the defendant take the stand and admit guilt,
the court nevertheless made an admission requirement.
We agree that the defendant need not take the stand in order to assert the
defense of entrapment, but we cannot see how one can passively admit
to the elements of the offense. This admission must be made in some
affirmative manner and cannot be assumed from a defendant's silence. If
170 Thus raising some significant questions under the Fifth Amendment SelfIncrimination Clause. See text accompanying notes 177, 191 infra.
171

732 F.2d 555 (6th Cir. 1984).
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18 U.S.C . § 2315.

17)

732 F.2d at 560.

1 74

United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 514 (3d Cir. 1981), cerl. denied. 464

U.S. 1039.
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657 P.2d 419 (Ariz. 1983).

1761d. at 420.
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the defendant does not wish to take the stand, he may, for example, offer
to stipulate to the admission ... if, as here, the state refuses the offered
stipulation the defendant can have his admission of the elements read
into evidence ... [no entrapment defense will be allowed, however,
where the defendant] sat mute and made no active admission of the
elements. 177

Most courts today, though, which follow the inconsistent
defense principle do not apply the rule as strictly as these
opinions. In particular, three chief "limitations" or "exceptions" consistently are used to Jessen the impact of the inconsistent defense doctrine.
The first limitation applies to the case in which the defendant
admits that he committed certain acts made unlawful under the
statute (selling the drugs, receiving the stolen goods, etc.) but
that he did not have the requisite state of mind required by the
law. In addition, he argues that if the jury disagrees with his
position, it should at least find that he could not be held for the
crime because he was unlawfully induced into selling the drugs
or receiving the goods by government agents. This limitation is
a popular one. As noted in one recent Pennsylvania case, the
supposed "inconsistency is, in fact, illusory." 178 That is, the
jury is simply being asked to find two things. One, that the
government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had the necessary intent; two, that even if the intent
was present, the government entrapped the defendant into
committing the acts necessary for the crime. Where the defendant admits the commission of the acts, but disputes the evidence as to intent, most courts do not apply the inconsistent
defense doctrine and instead allow the entrapment question to
go to the jury. 179 A case illustrative of the point is California v.
177

Jd.

178 Pennsylvania v. McGuire, 488 A.2d 1144, 1150 (Pa. 1985). The result would, of
course, be different if the other "defense" was not lack of intent but something which
became a clearly inconsistent position. The example given in the McGuire case was
alibi. These defenses would seem always to be inconsistent. See generally Martinez
v. New Mexico, 580 P.2d 968, 971 (N .M. 1978).
179 [A]ppellant' s testimony is susceptible to several interpretations which would
support an acquittal: (1) he did not possess the requisite legal intent, i.e., knowledge of the package's contents, and (2) regardless of any knowledge the appellant
may have had concerning the package's contents, the agents' conduct was "designed to induce [his] belief" that delivery of the parcel then was lawful. Whether
he did or did not know, or whether he was entrapped into committing the crimes,
are both reasonable conclusions based upon legitimate inferences supported by
the testimony. Because both constructions may be valid, there is no logical
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Barraza 180 where the defendant was convicted of selling heroin.
He conceded that he had sold the heroin, but challenged the
government's proof with respect to the intent requirement. The
court allowed the additional entrapment defense.
Further, such a defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's
theory .... His defense of denial did not extend to the inculpatory act
alleged-providing the agent with a note to facilitate her heroin purchase
transaction with another-but only to the intent with which such act was
committed. He claimed only that he did not intend to participate in a
heroin sale when he provided the agent with the note. He does not
subvert his position in arguing, "and irrespective of my intent, the
overzealous law enforcement conduct directed at me constitutes entrapment. " 181

Perhaps the leading case in the area is the Fifth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Greenfield. 182 There, the defendant
was charged with dispensing narcotics for improper purposes.
He admitted that he dispensed the drugs but denied any criminal
intent. He further made the standard argument that any improper intent that he might have had resulted from entrapment on
the part of the government agent who had purchased the drugs.
The court addressed the argument in some detail.
The sole contested issue at trial was the intent with which the acts were
committed. The defendant strenuously asserted that the prescriptions
... were for a legitimate medical purpose and within the course of his
professional practice. Necessarily, the issue of criminal intent or guilty
knowledge was a factual issue for the jury to resolve on the basis of
circumstantial evidence under the totality of the circumstances. It was a
subjective determination.
We do not believe that it is impermissibly inconsistent under these
circumstances for a defendant also to argue that to the extent that the
jury may find culpability on his part, he was entrapped. The defendant
may say, "1 did not go so far as to prescribe drugs without a legitimate
medical purpose, but to the extent that you find that I did , I was
entrapped." ... [I]t is permissible for the defendant to argue to the jury
that he was entrapped. That is, he may argue he did not knowingly

reason to prefer one to the total exclusion of the other; the appellant is entitled to
have the issue submitted to and decided by a jury.
McGuire, 488 A.2d at 1151.
180

591 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1979).
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[d. at 956.
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554 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 860.
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dispense the drugs without a legitimate medical purpose or, alternatively, he may argue that to the extent that he may have prescribed
without a legitimate medical purpose, he was not predisposed to do
SO.'83

The strict inconsistent defense theory traditionally has applied whether the defendant testified or not, so long as the
defendant did not admit to all the elements of the crime
charged}S4 Many courts today, however, are willing to allow
the entrapment defense to be raised even if the defendant did
not make such an admission as long as substantial evidence
regarding entrapment enters the case through the prosecution's
evidence. In such a case, a number of courts say that there
simply is no inconsistency of defenses being alleged by the
defendant; rather, the government has raised the issue.
In that situation a defendant may assert his or her own defense and still
ask that the jury consider the possibility of entrapment as raised by the
government itself. The availability of both defenses does not result from
inconsistent statements made by the defendant and does not unduly
burden the government, because the prosecution brings the issue into
the case. '8S

The Fifth Circuit in Sears v. United States '86 explained the
rationale for this rule, a rationale that at least hints at a due
process basis.
We do not think it is impermissibly inconsistent for defendant to deny
the acts charged, yet urge the court on motion for acquittal that the
government's own evidence establishes entrapment as a matter of law.
Similarly, the defendant is entitled to have a charge adjusted to the
evidence, and if the government injects evidence of entrapment into the
case, the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed that if they find
that he committed the acts charged, they must further consider whether
he was entrapped into committing them. We feel that the ultimate goal of
the criminal trial, the ascertainment of truth, permits no other course. A
criminal defendant should not forfeit what may be a valid defense, nor
should the court ignore what may be improper conduct by law enforce183

[d. at 183.

184 United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1314 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1118.

185 United States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 1161 (11th Cir. 1985); see also United States
v. Haimowitz, 752 F.2d 1561, 1573-1574 (lIth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, _ _ U.S.
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343 F.2d 139 (5th eir. 1965).
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ment officers, merely because the defendant elected to put the government to its proof. 187

Although not common today, some courts continue to adhere to the view that the entrapment defense can only be raised
by admission of the defendant, affirmatively, of the commission
of the offense. ISS See, for instance, the statement by the Sixth
Circuit in United States v. Whitley:189 "Whitley did not testify,
admit the acts or present any evidence whatsoever. To rely on
the defense of entrapment, the defendant must admit all elements of the offense. " 190
Such a strong adherence to the inconsistent defense doctrine
raises serious policy and constitutional questions. On the policy
side, it is difficult to understand why some courts absolutely
insist that the defendant affirmatively raise evidence for the
defense when the government's evidence raises a triable issue
concerning entrapment. There is no other area of the law regarding affirmative defenses that is treated accordingly. Moreover, with respect to the constitutionality of such a requirement, it would seem as if two concerns would be most acute:
Does the requirement shift the burden of proof impermissibly
from the government to the defendant with respect to the stateof-mind requirement, and under the due process clause can such
a restriction apply if it requires the defendant to offer testimony? The court in United States v. Henry stated the concerns very well:
The defendant is not required to testify or to concede guilt in order to
pursue the entrapment theory .... Any other holding would .. raise a
serious Fifth Amendment question." In no other area of law does the
defendant lose the right to put the government to its proof solely because
he wishes the jury to determine whether he should be acquitted based on
relevant evidence in the record. If the defendant does not testify , it is not
his admission of criminality that triggers the jury's obligation to consider
the entrapment defense. It is triggered by the presence of sufficient
evidence of inducement and predisposition in the record to raise an
187 Jd. at 143-144; see also Young v. Alabama, 469 So. 2d 683, 690 (Ala. 1985).
188 The view , of course, would be very strong in a state such as Arizona which is
so stringent with regard to its requirement that the defendant affinnatively offer
evidence (either as testimony or a stipulation) on the entrapment issue. See Arizona
v. Nilsen, note 175 supra , 657 P.2d at 424.
189

734 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1984).

190/d.

at 1139.
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entrapment issue. If this were not so, the defendant's right to have the
jury evaluate all the relevant evidence and to consider every issue
controlling the guilt-innocence determination would depend on his willingness to confess in whole or part. '9'

The final limitation applies in cases where, at first blush, it
appears there are inconsistent defenses involving entrapment;
upon analysis, however, the defenses do not turn out to be truly
inconsistent or contradictory. In such cases, almost always
involving conspiracy, the entrapment claim is normally allowed. There are a few principal cases in the area which will
demonstrate the point. The first is Henderson v. United
States 192 where the defendant was charged with conspiracy. He
denied any participation in conspiracy but admitted committing
certain overt acts that were charged in the indictment. His claim
was that he had been entrapped into committing the overt acts,
though he denied that he had actually participated in the illicit
agreement. A court could thus view the defendant as not being
guilty, either because he did not agree to commit a crime or
because he was entrapped into committing the charged overt
acts. These two defenses simply were not inconsistent, as they
did not "necessarily disprove" one another. "The defendant
could admit operating the illicit still, deny being a party to the
conspiracy charged, and still defend on the ground that such
overt acts as he did commit were done as a result of entrapment. "193
In United States v. Smith,194 the defendant was convicted of
selling narcotics unlawfully. Here, the claim was a bit different.
He admitted participating in the unlawful scheme, but asserted
that he had purchased the narcotics as an agent for another
person and thus was not an unlawful "seller" under the statute. 195 The defendant was permitted to make the entrapment
191 749 F.2d 203, 21l (5th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Stanley, 765 F.2d
1224, 1234 (lith Cir. 1985).
192

237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).

1931d. at 173.
194

407 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1969), cert . denied, 397 U.S. 949.

19S Under the statute, there was no liability ifthe defendant purchased as an agent
for another, as opposed to purchasing for himself in order to sell to others. The law
technically dealt with the sale of narcotics without making demand of a written
purchase order.
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defense because it did not disprove or conflict with the agency
defense under the statute.
By the defense in the instant case the appellant was in effect saying that,
although he participated in the transaction, his role was that of buyer's
agent, but whatever his role was he perfonned it as a result of entrapment. Under these circumstances the defenses of not guilty and entrapment are not so inconsistent that entrapment clearly would not be
available, and the circumstahces here could reasonably have been considered by the trial judge as a departure from the normal situation where
the two defenses would be wholly inconsistent. 196

The chief difficulty with the defense of a lack of conflict is
that in most cases, as a matter of fact, the claim cannot be
sustained. That is, apart from the other exceptions listed above,
the defenses are indeed in conflict or are inconsistent. See, for
instance, an Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. Smith. 197
The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine. He raised two very different defenses. The first was
that he did not conspire with anyone other than the government
agents, thus not creating an illegal conspiracy.198 The second
defense was that if he did conspire with persons other than the
government agents, he was induced by those government
agents to do so. As stated by the court, a clear conflict existed
and entrapment would not be allowed as a defense.
It is difficult to imagine two defenses more inconsistent than these two
relied upon by Smith. If the jury were to believe that Smith did not
conspire with non-agents, it could not simultaneously find that agents
had entrapped him into conspiring with others. In addition , since the
alleged offense in this case, conspiracy, looks to a state of mind, agreement, as its actus reus, Smith has not even admitted the criminal act as
alleged by the government, much less the criminal intent. 199

In spite of cases such as Smith, considerable policy and
constitutional arguments can be raised against strict enforce-

196

407 F.2d at 204.

197

757 F.2d 1161 (lIth Cir. 1985).

198 In the majority of jurisdictions, a "true" agreement must be present with two
or more persons actually intending to commit a crime and agreeing to do so. The
presence of government agents will defeat the agreement requirement if only one
individual actually intends to commit the crime. See P. Marcus, The Prosecution and
Defense of Criminal Conspiracy Cases § 2.04 (1978).
199

757 F.2d at 1169.
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ment ofthe inconsistent defense rule. Particularly, in states that
have adopted the objective theory of entrapment, judges may
well be willing to allow inconsistent defenses involving entrapment to be asserted. Still, even in those jurisdictions that purport to apply the inconsistent defense limitation, few apply the
rule strictly. As a general matter, there are numerous exceptions to the rule which have eliminated the harshness of the rule
in most situations.
Conclusion

The three problems discussed in this article-burden of
proof, questions of law/fact, inconsistent defenses-are procedural in nature. Nevertheless, they are often crucial in the
determination of entrapment cases. Particularly in jurisdictions
that have adopted the subjective-predisposition test, courts may
consider these problems in order to look to government conduct
in resolving entrapment questions. These three procedural devices create opportunities for prosecutors, defense counsel, as
well as trial judges to explore the relationship between the two
entrapment tests in ways that are often crucial to the outcome of
important cases.
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